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Abstract 
This study discusses the experience of the implementation of a peer-norm in reducing free riding 
and conflict problems in teamwork activities. This exploratory experiment is run with two cohorts 
of students in one of the principal Spanish universities. The educational problem is to control for 
student potential collusion (with clear free riding episodes) in homework projects performed by 
assigned groups. The peer-norm intends to control for it. The empirical analysis identifies that the 
success of this norm is associated with the presence of foreign students. Empirically, the presence 
of foreign students in each cohort brings an educational and cultural background different from 
the native’s one. Their presence in work-groups turns out to be the key factor to reduce potential-
ly the degree of collusion in the overall cohort because they seem to be less concerned by the “so-
cial retaliation” of the mates. 
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1. Introduction 
This contribution aims at presenting novel evidence about the creation of an ad-hoc peer norm that is expected 
to limit the free-riding problem in group activity. This evidence refers to a specific case study: the implementa-
tion of a new education program in European countries. 
The new European Superior Education Space (ESES) program entails important changes in the structure and 
organization of teaching activity at university level. This education reform applies to European Union countries 
and it assigns great importance to activities students complete out of the class-time. Those activities aim to de-
velop several transversal skills and favor cooperative work. However, the implementation of several group ac-
tivities outside of the regular teaching hours often gives rise to problems associated with the effectiveness of the 
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organization of their tasks and the need to define a device for identifying the individual’s contribution to the 
running of joint projects. 
In addition, it has often been pointed out that teamwork may suffer from situations of internal conflicts be-
tween group members in the completion of the assigned tasks which affect their accomplishment. The most fre-
quent complaint of the members of the group is indeed about the free-riding problem that is usually reported to 
the lecturer by the group members individually or in smaller sub-groups (del Canto et al., 2009). 
The ESES reform in higher education means that academics face a clear problem of implementing an effec-
tive scheme for grading teamwork activities. In order to achieve this scope, it appears to be appropriate to im-
plement incentive devices yielding a typical separating equilibrium (under the viewpoint of the incomplete in-
formation theory) for individual evaluations. Economic theory suggests that these are cases in which the en-
gagement of individuals to achieve a target (namely, to complete the teamwork activity) is a truly effective way 
to overcome the problem of free-riding (Hamilton et al., 2003; Macho-Stadler & Pérez-Castrillo, 2001). It has 
also been proven that peer pressure and other factors such as norms, mutual monitoring and empathy to interact, 
provide the right incentives for getting rid of the free-rider problem and avoiding the pooling equilibrium situa-
tion for individual evaluation (Kandel & Lazear, 1992). 
This study deals with the empirical analysis of one of the out-of-class experience encouraged by the ESES 
reform1. In line with the established theoretical framework, and in order to control for the aforementioned free- 
rider problems for the selected out-of class activity, I implemented a specific norm to be applied by all the stu-
dents enrolled in my class. This norm has been built on the spirit of being able to eliminate conflicts among 
group members, identify individual participation to the teamwork (and then grading each student appropriately) 
and limit free-riding or collusive behavior. The aim of the norm is to provide suitable pressure among peers 
(through mutual monitoring), thereby making them derive the highest utility in revealing private information ra-
ther than keeping it as a secret. In practical terms, this translated into the action to declare, quantify and jointly 
subscribe to each individual’s participation and contribution to the teamwork. This produces a situation in which 
students may effectively differentiate their individual participation in the teamwork (and then, in practice, achie- 
ving an expected separated equilibrium). Hansen et al. (2006) have already adopted something similar to study 
the determinants of productivity performance in a college classroom achieving good results. 
Once implemented, this norm allowed a pilot experiment to run in order to collect quantitative information on 
the individual participation to the teamwork project for two different cohorts of students.  
The empirical analysis of these data is informative. In addition to reducing the rate of conflicts,2 the imple-
mented norm has enabled the identification of the factors which endorse the students’ ability to achieve a stable 
equilibrium, in which they admit their true contribution to the teamwork. The econometric analysis identifies 
that the presence of foreign students (mainly Erasmus students)3 is the key factor that reduces students’ incen-
tives to either cheating or free-riding. In this respect, the adoption of the peer norm allowed achieving the estab-
lished goal and, hence, a few conclusions about the importance of the heterogeneous composition of the class 
are put forward as an effective device to reach that goal. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follow: Section 2 discusses the organization of the experiment while Sec-
tions 3 and 4 analyze and discuss the empirical results. Finally, Section 5 provides conclusions. 
2. Conflict Resolution: The Established Norm and the Experience 
This experiment has been led at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (henceforth, UAB). It has been run in 
one of the elective courses (External trade) operating as part of the undergraduate business training. This course 
is quite popular among local students, but also among students coming in from foreign universities mostly under 
the framework of the Erasmus program. 
The experience has been conducted using the two cohorts of students for academic years 2012-2013 and 
2013-2014. 
 
 
1I am aware that data exploited in this contribution refer to a particular case study. Therefore, I believe that this study delivers interesting 
exploratory results encourage the further extension of this research line in a properly planned field experiment. 
2It refers to the conflicts reported to the lecturer as discussed in del Canto et al. (2009). The norm was effective because since its implemen-
tation I stopped receiving complains about the involvement of individuals in the making of the group report. 
3The Erasmus (European Community Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students) programme is a student exchange programme 
that has been established since 1987 inside the European Union member states. In order to be eligible to participate to this programme, a 
candidate must be coursing at university degree or diploma and having completed the first year course. 
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I have been teaching this course since 2009. In the academic year 2012-2013, the ESES reforms required to 
organize new forms of evaluation of students (beyond the final exam), generally promoting the implementation 
of team working. My first concern has been establishing a norm to control the organization of the teamwork, to 
limit the potential conflict among students and, at the same time, to be effective for grading them individually.  
The organization of the teamwork activity follows two main criteria. First, the group activity is a compulsory 
requirement for all students to pass the course. Second, students are completely free to form their groups and the 
group size must be between two and six persons, even if my personal suggestion is to aim for a group of 3/4 
members4. Each group is expected to deliver a report that deals with a case study about the internationalization 
process of one Spanish firm or brand. The guidelines to produce the report are available on the course webpage.5 
Once the report has been completed, all member groups are expected to present their report to the rest of the 
class. Since the beginning of the course, students know that they will be graded individually for this activity. 
They also know that the final grade for this report will be equally based on the grade of the document they de-
liver plus their individual presentation.  
The challenging point of this action is to be able to differentiate the individual contribution of each student in 
the writing of the report in order to properly grade him or her individually and limit the free-riding or collusion 
problem. In order to control for this problem, I introduced a further requirement in the official guidelines of the 
group project: a type of peer-norm. When producing the report, students are also expected to deliver a joint dec-
laration in a sealed envelope. This declaration is a self-assessment of the individual’s participation to the making 
of the report (usually in percentage of the total work) that must be signed by all the members of the group. Stu-
dents know that this information will be used to determine the individual final grade for the report exercise, but 
they ignore the way I will use the information.6 
Two remarks about the experiment: whereas in the first cohort of the experiment (groups in the academic year 
2012-2013) three groups did not turn in the envelope, all the groups turned in this document during the academic 
year 2013-2014. As a preliminary result, this peer-norm was effective in eliminating any complaint from stu-
dents about free-riding situations or internal conflict at group level. To the same extent, the norm was also effec-
tive in identifying students’ participation, because the declarations allowed me to recognize a consistent number 
of groups that admitted an unequal split of the required tasks for producing the report.  
3. Data and Analysis 
The data gathered during the trial are summarized in Table 1. Overall, this involved 125 students, of whom 
about 40% were foreign (Erasmus) students.7 As for gender composition, the group is relatively balanced, with 
40% of women. The total number of groups that we are taking into consideration is 35 (in the two years) and 
they worked on 26 different case studies.8 On average, the group consisted of four persons, and 76% of the 
groups declared that all members had participated identically (equal split variable) in the tasks assigned to the 
group work, but with a high variance. Statistics on the participation share (the share partic. variable) identify 
that, on average, each individual produced 30% of the group work but there are extreme cases in which a mem-
ber did not collaborate and the others took care of all of the tasks (refer to statistics about the share partic.). 
We begin our analysis by looking at some statistical significant correlations. Table 2 displays the corres-
ponding statistics. 
Looking at our pool of data, it is possible to establish that the presence of Erasmus students is directly asso-
ciated with the smallest groups (in terms of size) and, in addition, their presence is negatively correlated with the  
 
 
4It is important to remember that each cohort has no less than 50 students, of whom a significant part is students coming in from other uni-
versities (mostly foreign universities). Being an elective course with more than 50 students per year, it is equally likely that the group may 
be composed of long-term mates or by just foreign students or a mixture of these. In this respect, it is sufficiently reasonable to think of the 
group formation as being quite random, because none of the previous alternatives dominates the others. Furthermore, I have no possibility to 
access to the students’ admissions files (above all the foreign ones) and I cannot replicate the content of the experience implemented by 
Moore (2011). 
5Available at http://rosellanicolini.com/guidelines_english.pdf 
6In this analysis, I am not exploiting the cardinality of the grades of each student. Cardinality will be a measure to study educational perfor-
mance, but this is not relevant for the scope. A reader will be fine by knowing that all reports were graded above the minimum threshold es-
tablished by the Spanish educational system to pass an exam or any other type of academic evaluation. 
7As Erasmus students we identify any foreign (not UAB) student enrolled in the class. The Erasmus programme does not finance a propor-
tion of them because they belong to some interchange agreement signed by UAB with other no EU-universities. We define them all as 
Erasmus since the aforementioned difference is not relevant for this study. 
8As a rule, no duplication of case study is admitted in each year, but the same case study can be replicated in two different years. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics. 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Gender 125 0.4 0.492 0 1 
Erasmus 122 0.418 0.495 0 1 
Equal split 107 0.766 0.425 0 1 
Share partic 107 29.104 17.341 0 100 
Group size 125 4.088 1.314 2 6 
Source: own data. Calculus: author. 
 
Table 2. Correlations. 
 Group size Share part Erasmus Gender Equal split 
Share part −0.6554 1.0000    
 0.0000     
Erasmus −0.5580 0.4253 1.0000   
 0.0000 0.0000    
Gender −0.1423 0.0234 −0.0503 1.0000  
 0.1135 0.0000 0.5882   
Equal split 0.1753 −0.0926 −0.4009 0.1527 1.0000 
 0.0710 0.3426 0.0000 0.1163  
Decision topic −0.4504 0.3091 0.4248 −0.0311 −0.3097 
 0.0000 0.0012 0.0000 0.7309 0.0012 
Legend: Bold: coefficient significance at 1%. Italics: coefficient significance at 5% or 10%. p-value below coefficients. Source: own data. Calculus: 
author. 
 
event of getting a (declared) equal split of the individual participation to the teamwork. As a counterpart of this 
effect, Erasmus students usually seem to be taking a relatively higher share of participation in the job. In addi-
tion, groups with Erasmus students seem also been more pro-active in selecting the topic of the case study (De-
cision topic variable) in a more autonomous way. 
Furthermore, we also performed additional statistics to assess whether Erasmus students tend to be more 
pro-active in doing on average more work. We rescale the variable share part as the difference between the re-
ported value and the equal-share value. Then, we compute the correlation between this last variables and the 
Erasmus one. We get no statistical significant correlation that Erasmus students are more prone to take care of 
the highest part of tasks in the accomplishment of the group work.9 
In this line of analysis, the econometric exercise confirms the previous preliminary outcomes (Table 3). The 
values reported in Table 3 are the regression coefficients. We consider as a dependent variable Equal split, 
namely the declared output of the task division among students. This is a dummy variable that has been built to 
examine whether all the members of a group split the job equally between them. The equal-share variable is a 
proper mechanism to control for the moral hazard problem in teams. If students anticipate that by not participat-
ing to the group work as much as the correspondent equal-share, they are taking the risk of not having their 
equal-share in the common declaration and, therefore, being penalized with a lower grade, then they have the 
right incentive to participate as much as the other group-mates. In this experience, this variable is considered to 
be a proxy of the typical pooling equilibrium in a signaling game in which it is not possible to discriminate 
among agents. Given the implementation of our peer-norm, whenever this dummy variable takes the value zero, 
it is the signal that each member of the group recognizes an uneven individual participation to the accomplish-
ment of the job without incurring in any type of conflicts with the other members of the group.10 
 
 
9Statistics are available upon request. 
10We are also running a robustness check in order to control for the potential problems associated with the independent treatment of the in-
dividuals participating to the same group activity. In Appendix A, in Table A1 we report estimations when considering the group as one 
observation. Erasmus and Gender variables are considered as dummies for the presence in a group of at least one foreign student and a 
woman respectively. Results do not change with respect to the case presented in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Probit estimations. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 1.16 (1.44) 1.09*** (0.256) 1.09** (0.497) 
Group size −0.007 (0.27)   
Erasmus −1.49***(0.456) −1.44*** (0.48) −1.44** (0.644) 
Gender 0.411 (0.334) 0.557 (0.534) 0.557*** (0.144) 
Gender × Erasmus  −0.24 (0.674) −0.24 (0.49) 
Time dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Errors White (heteroskedastic-robust) White (heteroskedastic-robust) Cluster (by subject)11 
Log likelihood −47.51 −47.44 −47.44 
Pseudo R-square 0.18 0.18 0.18 
Obs. 106 106 106 
Dependent variable: Equal split; Std errors into brackets. ***, **, *Level of significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
The probit estimation definitely assesses that the most efficient way to differentiate the individual participa-
tion to the teamwork project is to include at least one Erasmus student in the group. This result is robust and 
consistent across all estimations and error corrections. In contrast, when correcting for the clustering of errors 
(by product-case study)12, the presence of a woman smoothes the differentiation process among the members of 
the group.13 
The clear effect of foreign students in tempering the collusion problem is not a novelty in the literature. Watts 
et al. (2011) identified that the quality of the group work of engineering students improved during the telematic 
simulation when they were in contact with student teams from other countries. However, this is the first time 
that it has been possible to assess this effect quantitatively in an econometric exercise.  
4. Robustness Check: Pre-Commitment Threat 
An important factor that could undermine this experiment is the potential pre-commitment agreements among 
students. This can be a problem not only among persons following the same undergraduate track, but also 
among Erasmus students if they share other courses or have other common interests, for example. 
The pre-commitment option is somewhat endogenous to the culture of a society. Since my groups include 
peoples from different cultures and bringing very different social norms or habits, I cannot exclude a-priori that 
the norm introduced in this experience was excluding or dissuading students from this type of collusion. 
Of course, this is private information and there is no direct way to assess it. However, I am able to approx-
imate it by referring to the extra information I gathered during the course. In particular, I am referring to the ad-
ditional individual report that each student is expected to produce.14 After providing the group report, each stu-
dent is required (as a part of the final assessment) to provide an individual report following a working scheme 
similar to the one followed for the group report. Therefore, if a student participates actively in producing the 
group report and manage a good knowledge of the data analysis in that work, they would not have any problem 
in working on the data analysis issues required in the individual report. Therefore, where each group member 
participates fully in the group report, they would be expected to get a grade for the individual report in line with 
the one achieved with the group report and presentation. If not, the presence of collusion among the group 
members must be suspected.  
The sample of students providing the group and individual reports is identical. Thus, with the information at 
hand I created a new variable (comm_index). This variable aims at detecting the potential existence of (stable) 
 
 
11The case studies present a different degree of difficulty to deal with them properly. For instance, data or other quantitative information are 
not always public available and, if this is the case, students are expected to put more effort to accomplish the expected tasks. This further 
constraint makes them more concerned about the equal split of the job and in the reporting of the effort. 
12This means taking into account the condition that one product-case study can be repeated from one year to another and so information may 
circulate among groups belonging to different cohorts. 
13This result is quite novel because previous evidence usually assesses a positive discrimination versus females in collaborative homework 
assignments (Parker, 2010). 
14More information can be found at: http://rosellanicolini.com/exterioren.htm. 
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commitment agreements among students in order to declare the equal split of the job in the case of recording an 
individual asymmetric participation to the group report. Accordingly, this is a dichotomy variable that takes 
value one, whenever a student got two different marks in the two exercises, and zero otherwise. In practice, to be 
relevant, this difference has to be sufficiently large (more than one point over ten) in order to identify the exis-
tence of any pre-commitment mechanism.15 I ran probit estimations in order to understand to what extent the 
norm introduced in this trial was able to control for this collusion threat. Results are presented in Table 4.  
We built estimations in Table 4 by exploiting the results shown in Table 3. Irrespective of the type of error 
correction, the Erasmus variable always displays a significant negative correlation coefficient. As for the varia-
ble representing commitment agreements (Comm_index) either it is not statistically significant or it is negative. 
In case of assuming that the reporting is accurate, no relevant difference is expected to appear between group 
and individual reports, therefore the comm_index variable is expected to be zero. Instead, in case of recording 
deviations in individual scores with respect to the group one (that is a signal for the presence of pre-commitment 
agreements), then the expected sign for the comm_index variable is negative, indeed. Our results point out the 
presence of potential collusion-type behavior among students that we are able to indentify when adopting a 
clustering correction for error. There appears to be a clear association in the case where there is a large differ-
ence in student performance in the two evaluation activities and the low probability of getting the group-decla- 
ration that assesses different individual participation rate to the group report. However, this result does not im-
pact on the statistical significance of our key variable (namely, Erasmus). In this respect, the peer-norm seems 
being effective because the principal results are not affected by the introduction of this further control. 
5. Conclusions 
This study discusses the outcome of an experiment concerning the introduction of a peer-norm as a signaling 
device for teamwork tasks. Economic literature allowed formatting a peer-norm yielding to a separating-type 
equilibrium in a typical signaling game. The exercise turned out to be useful in implementing a mechanism to 
reduce conflict among teamwork members and allowed them to tailor their individual final grade to their de-
clared participation to the teamwork activity. In this respect, the presence of foreign students in teams tempers 
the propensity to collude and promotes a separating-type equilibrium. The role of the foreign students is cer-
tainly driven in part by their cultural and education background. It is not certainly due to a biased selection 
composition because UAB (and, in general, Barcelona) is one of the preferred destinations for educational ex-
change-programs and we host students from all around the world without a clear dominance of one community 
over the others. Instead, it is possible that the structure of the program (students’ stays are limited to one or two 
terms) makes Erasmus students be less concerned by the potential “social retaliation” of the mates and, therefore, 
they end-up being the less willing to collude. Then, this behavior generates a positive externality that reduces the 
degree of collusion in the overall cohort.  
To a large extent, these results endorse the importance of maintaining the international interchange programs 
(as the Erasmus ones) not only for the advantages they may bring in terms of cultural exchange and cohesions in 
youth generations, but also as a potential effective device to limit distorting behavior in team activities. 
 
Table 4. Probit estimations. 
 (1) (2) 
Constant 1.81 (0.502)*** 1.81 (0.625)*** 
Erasmus −1.54 (0.39)*** −1.54 (0.604)** 
Comm_index −0.38 (0.25) −0.38 (0.18)** 
Time dummy yes yes 
Errors White Cluster (by subject) 
Log likelihood −47.14 −47.14 
Pseudo R-square 0.19 0.19 
Obs. 106 106 
Dependent variable: Equal split; Std errors into brackets. ***, **, *Level of significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 
15The rationale behind the creation of this variable is straightforward. Being the expertise required for the two exercises identical, an indi-
vidual report whose grade is by far lower than the one of the group report unveils that the author did not participated actively to the group 
report without accumulating the right expertise to produce the second document. 
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Appendix A 
Table A1. Probit estimations. 
 (1) 
Constant 1.75**(0.76) 
Erasmus −1.52** (0.65) 
Gender −0.41 (0.334) 
Time dummy Yes 
Errors White (heteroskedastic-robust) 
Log likelihood −15.30 
Pseudo R-square 0.18 
Obs. 31 
Dependent variable: Group with an Equal split declaration among its members. Std errors into brackets (White correction). ***, **, *Level of signi-
ficance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 

